The CJEU's approach contributes to more convergence in consumer protection throughout the EU. Yet, in terms of legitimacy, it must be noted that in all cases the CJEU has maintained a clear distinction between interpretation and application. The particular constitutional legal order in which the CJEU operates only allows for a process whereby the contours of a more coherent European consumer protection policy are gradually revealed. In the absence of sufficient legislative guidance at the European and national levels, national courts may be increasingly informed by the case law of the CJEU in an effort to establish clearly desirable common expectations. Those who believe that, in practice, uniformity can be achieved overnight by simply adopting a common maximum norm appear over-optimistic.
Introduction
The EU's extensive engagement with consumer protection law is well documented (Howells 2017) . It sees a European approach to these issues as a means of removing barriers to trade, and to the creation of a common competitive environment. However, the extent to which full harmonisation is possible or desirable is debated. We take two directives -one in which a minimum harmonization approach has been adopted (Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms) and the other in which a maximum harmonization approach has been adopted (Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices). We first note the ways in which this legislation tries to steer a path between imposing a common European standard and allowing national variation. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) seeks to limit national discretion by structuring the standard, and use of, an indicative list, whereas, despite adopting a maximum harmonisation approach, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) has limits to its scope, and exceptions allowing for some national traditions. Moreover, the open textured nature of the norms allows room for flexible application.
This leads on to our second point of discussion relating to the role of the courts in developing common norms. Central to this discussion is the differentiated role between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the interpreter of European law and the national courts as the party that applies it. This relationship provides a release valve to prevent any direct clashes, and allows a subtle way for national perspectives to be reflected.
Unfair Contract Terms Directive

The Directive's unfairness standard
Art. 3(1) provides: 'A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer'.
Art. 4(2) provides: 'Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language'.
There is an annex of indicatively unfair terms. Inclusion in the annex does not create any formal presumption of unfairness, though in practice courts do take notice of whether challenged terms are similar to those found in the Annex. The Annex includes exclusion and limitation clauses and also penalty clauses. The other terms in the Annex deal more with ensuring there is a balance between the two parties -this fits in with the core requirement that there be a significant imbalance. These have been classified as terms that (i) give one party control over the contract terms or the performance of the contract, (ii) control the duration of the contract and (iii) which prevent the parties having equal rights (Howells 1997, 106-107) .
Good faith and significant imbalance
Good faith is not an independent test of unfairness, but rather is linked to the establishment of a significant imbalance. Recital 15 provides that 'Whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, of the unfair character of terms, in particular in sale or supply activities of a public nature providing collective services which take account of solidarity among users, must be supplemented by a means of making an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; whereas this constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer; whereas the E -186 requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account'. Does this standard only require a clear conscience and use or transparent procedures, or as the recital suggests is a contractor required to take some account of the legitimate interests of the other party? (Farnsworth 1962, 666; Brownsword 1994, 197) The CJEU has interpreted this as requiring an assessment of 'whether the seller or supplier could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract negotiations'.
II Moreover, does good faith go beyond mere procedural controls, and require that some terms be always considered unfair as they are so seriously imbalanced? As Hugh Beale comments I suspect that good faith has a double operation. First, it has a procedural aspect. It will require the supplier to consider the consumer's interests. However, a clause which might be unfair if it came as a surprise may be upheld if the business took steps to bring it to the consumer's attention and to explain it.
Secondly, it has a substantive content: some clauses may cause such an imbalance that they should always be treated as […] unfair (Beale 1995, 245) .
Whatever, the meaning of good faith, the requirement of significant imbalance indicates that there must be some substantive unfairness. There are judicial statements in which assessment of imbalance should involve a comparison with the legal position without the term. III Exclusion and limitation clauses are therefore obvious such targets of this regulation. One approach to evaluating imbalance is to ask whether the consumer would reasonably accept the term if it was drawn to their attention. IV The CJEU sees this as part of the good faith test, V whereas it might be better to ask that question to establish whether there is a substantive imbalance. If an imbalance were found then there might be a consideration of whether it was contrary to good faith, and factors such as transparency and any justifications for using the term could be taken into account. The possible agreement test looks at fairness from the consumer's perspective, but the good faith standard also raises the distinct question of the extent to which the supplier has to take consumer's interests into account.
The ambiguous nature of the good faith test is perplexing when trying to distil the ultimate rationale for the regulation of unfair terms. However, it can be very useful as a 
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cloak for the differential application of the norms between legal systems. In this respect, it can be recalled that the minimum harmonisation level of the UCTD allows Member States to adopt a stricter unfairness test; for instance, Belgian legislation, in transposition of the directive, does not refer to good faith as part of the unfairness test.
Core terms
The exclusion in art. 4(2) of what might loosely be called core terms underlines that the Directive is not concerned with the fairness of the core bargain. Recital 19 explains:
'assessment of unfair character shall not be made of terms which describe the main subject matter of the contract nor the quality/price ratio of the goods or services supplied'. Market forces should discipline such terms: allowing their challenge would interfere with freedom of contract (Brandner 1991, 647) . Consumers can be expected to look after these matters for themselves. Regulation is needed of those more technical terms that consumers will not think to consider, or even be able to evaluate, and yet can cause them unfair surprises. The ability to have a broad or narrow interpretation of art. 4(2) is another lever to have a more or less uniform approach.
Plain and intelligible language
Terms must be drafted in plain and intelligible language.
VI The sanction is to interpret the term in the manner most favorable to the consumer. VII If core terms are not drafted accordingly, they will be subject to assessment for fairness. The average consumer was invoked to ensure that legal and technical jargon should be eschewed (Willett 2007, 328-332) . Terms must not only be formally understood, but their consequences should also be understandable by the average consumer. This is part of a broader transparency requirement. The extent to which this is embraced can again affect the level of uniformity.
CJEU case law
Procedural effectiveness
The case law of the CJEU has been far richer and more expansive than might have been anticipated (Wilhemsson 2017; Micklitz 2014, 771 
General approach
The preliminary reference is a co-operative procedure between the CJEU and national courts (art. 267 TFEU). The CJEU's role is to interpret EU law, but it is for national courts to apply it. The CJEU has described the unfairness test as vague, XII and has wanted to give guidance on the test and the annex. Yet, it has appreciated that it would be overburdened given the potentially large number of unfair terms that might be referred. 
Significant imbalance and good faith
The CJEU has only recently started to give guidance on the core elements of the fairness test. In Aziz, it noted that 'in referring to concepts of good faith and significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer, Article 3(1) of the directive merely defines in a general way the factors that render unfair a contractual term that has not been individually negotiated'.
XVI
This seems to support the view that the fairness test is an amalgam of procedural and substantive justice.
The CJEU has said that 'to ascertain whether a term causes a "significant imbalance" in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer, it must in particular be considered what rules of national law would apply in the absence of an agreement by the parties in that regard. Such a comparative analysis will enable the national court to evaluate whether and, as the case may be, to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national law in force. To that end, an assessment should also be carried out of the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at his disposal, under national legislation, to prevent continued use of unfair terms'. 
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In Aziz, the CJEU stated that 'in order to assess whether the imbalance arises "contrary to the requirement of good faith", it must be determined whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract negotiations'.
XVIII
As suggested above, this may be a better test of whether there is significant imbalance rather than a lack of good faith. The fact that the Court uses this test in the context of good faith indicates that use of a substantively unfair term can in itself be contrary to good faith.
Core terms
In Kásler v OTP Jelzáogbank
XIX the CJEU noted that under Art. 4(2) the exclusion from assessment of terms relating to the main subject matter of the contract, or the price or remuneration, was an exception that had to be construed strictly. It accepted the core/ancillary term distinction. Terms falling within the 'main subject matter of the contract' are 'those that lay down the essential obligations of the contract and, as such, characterize it'. Ancillary terms are therefore those that do not decide the essence of the contract. Whether the exchange rate for monthly repayments fell within the main subject matter was left to the national courts. XX The Court held that the exclusion for price or remuneration could not apply to a term that simply fixed exchange rates, as that could not be considered remuneration. Previously the exemption had not been applied to a mechanism for amending prices of services in Nemzeti Fogyastovedelmi Hatosag v Invitel Tavkozlesli ZRT. XXI The CJEU seems to have sent a clear signal that this exemption should be narrowly construed, but its application is again a matter for national law.
Transparency
The CJEU has given some very strong guidance on what is required for terms to be plain and intelligible. This is crucial, for even core terms can be reviewed if they fail to meet this standard. In Nemzeti Fogyastovedelmi Hatosag v Invitel Tavkozlesli ZRT XXII it was held that the power to vary the contract had to provide the method for fixing fees and the reasons for amendment. XXIII These had to be set out in plain and intelligible language so consumers could foresee, on the basis of clear intelligible criteria, the amendments that the supplier could make. XXIV Equally, the importance of consumers knowing how a power to amend Parking Eye v Beavis XXXVIII shows a recent example of the room for legitimate disagreement on how the test should be applied. It concerned the fairness of a £85 charge for overstaying a two-hour free parking offer. Lord Toulson found that this created a significant imbalance, as it was a greater imposition than the damages normally recovered. XXXIX He argued that it had not been proven that a consumer would accept the term, and noted that for some consumers this was a hefty sum, that applied even if the overstay was short. In his view, Lords Neuberger and Sumption had erred in holding a term was reasonable, because it was reasonable for the supplier to include the term. They had also been persuaded by the prominence of the term, and the fact that the car park had good reasons to impose the charge to ensure compliance. They also agreed with Lord
Mance that it was a fair trade-off for two hours free parking. This case illustrates that the test leaves a lot of discretion, and that even senior judges can come to different conclusions when applying it. These differences seem to be more due to the attitude of the judge to social protection of consumers, than any factor unique to the common law, given the differences between common law judges (Howells, forthcoming).
We mentioned above that there is no or very little legislative guidance on how the transparency requirement must be applied. Consequently, when assessing the transparency of contract terms, national courts enjoy a broad discretion.
Focussing on core terms, the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015 provides that the exemption of Article 4 (2) UCTD applies only if the core term is also prominent. A term is prominent if it is brought to the consumer's attention in such a way that an average consumer would be aware of it (S. 64 (4)). In most of the other Member States of the EU there is no equivalent requirement to bring core contract terms to the consumer's attention.
The absence of sufficient legislative guidance has led to divergent interpretations of the transparency requirement, despite the gap filling case law of the CJEU referred to above. In
Poland for instance, core terms are in conformity with the rule in the directive excluding them from the unfairness test, if they are worded clearly. XL Yet, the clarity requirement refers to the substance of the standard term concerned, and is satisfied if the term allows for only one possible meaning viewed from the perspective of the average consumer.
French case law remains quite hesitant to apply the transparency principle on core terms (Rochfeld 2004, 981) . French courts have historically been quite reluctant to declare a core term null only because of the lack of clarity of that term. Czech case law also shows that the exclusion from the unfairness test of core contract terms is not subject to an elaborate transparency requirement (Illdiko Sik-Simon, 2017).
The most protective approach is to be found in Finland, where core contract terms are not excluded from the unfairness test. A similar protection seems available in Greece, although this does not appear to have been a deliberate legislative choice. Greek legislation omitted an exclusion for core contract terms, so that the protection against unfair terms in consumer contracts extends to cover these. However, influenced by the case law of the CJEU, Greek courts have increasingly interpreted national legislation in conformity with the Directive and the CJEU's case law. In the absence of any legislative guidance on how the transparency principle must be applied, Greek case law developed three principles for the assessment of the transparency of any contract term. First, the principle that contract terms must be clear (grammatically correct and succinct, no obscure terms) and comprehensible (subjective ability of the consumer to realize the term's true meaning);
second, the principle of the determinable content of terms (no vague terms); and third, the principle of foreseeability of terms (prohibiting unexpected, unusual, surprising or misleading terms). Businesses must ensure that contract terms correspond to those three principles, assessed from the point of view of an average consumer, who is assumed to be a self-aware and responsible person (Dellios 2015, 118-119) .
A broader approach is to be found in Italy, where despite the fact that the Italian legislator also attaches great importance to the transparency of consumer contract terms, 
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Italian courts seem to apply an ex post case-by-case approach by exclusion. Clauses that obviously do not correspond to the transparency requirement are excluded, such as contradictory terms in the consumer contract, as are terms that are drafted in highly technical (financial) language and terms written in an ambiguous, vague language (Giorgianni 2009, 209) .
Belgian case law also offers examples of incoherent, and thus non-transparent, terms in consumer contracts.
XLII On one occasion the Liège Court of Appeal was more willing to accept the transparent character of a term in an insurance contract. XLIII Prior to RWE Vertrieb, cited above, the Brussels Court of Appeal held that the general information duty imposed on businesses does not require the seller to inform the consumer of the consequences of legal requirements, even though these requirements could have had an impact on the fairness of some of the contract terms.
XLIV
Thus, one can see that case law creates a dialogue between the CJEU and national courts; there is convergence, but also room for national discretion. However, we see in the transparency requirement, and the characterisation of the 'average consumer', that the CJEU has placed the spotlight on the need to ensure consumer protection has practical value for consumers.
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD)
3.1. Directive's scheme and harmonisation method
Broad scope
The UCPD has a very broad scope. It applies to unfair business-to-consumer (B2C) commercial practices before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product. 
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The particularly wide scope of the directive extends to any commercial practice directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers. Also mixed commercial practices (with B2C and B2B aspects) fall within its scope. According to recital 6 in the preamble to Directive 2005/29/EC, only national legislation relating to unfair commercial practices 'which harm "only" competitors' economic interests or which relate to a transaction between traders is thus excluded from that scope'.
XLVI
The general scheme of the directive is characterised by three types of prohibition. First, the general norm of Article 5 functions as a catch all clause, and prohibits unfair commercial practices in general. It provides that a commercial practice is unfair if it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distorts, or is likely materially to distort, the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product.
Second, the directive defines two precise categories of unfair commercial practices, namely misleading practices and aggressive practices. These so-called smaller general norms prohibit misleading and aggressive practices, that having regard to their nature and the factual context cause, or are likely to cause, the average consumer to take a transactional decision which he would not otherwise have taken.
Lastly, Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC establishes an exhaustive list of 31 (misleading and aggressive) commercial practices which are regarded as unfair in all circumstances. Consequently, these commercial practices alone can be deemed to be unfair without a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of the directive, and in the light of the average consumer.
To apply the UCPD in practice, first it must be verified if the alleged unfair practice is 
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Member States no longer enjoy broad discretion to regulate unfair commercial practices.
However, the UCPD excludes some practices of its scope and also contains a number of safeguard clauses which allow Member States to further regulate the field. 
Excluded practice, safeguard clauses and open norms
The UCPD does not regulate health and safety rules, rules on taste and decency, contract law, authorisation regimes and deontological rules for liberal professions that are in conformity with EU-law. Member States remain fully competent in those fields subject 
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actions as an example: it prohibits commercial practices that contain false, or even factually correct information that, including the overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to one or more of the elements specified in the provision, and causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise (see art. 6 (1) UPCD). References to the overall presentation of commercial practice and its impact on the purchase decision of a consumer entail a certain discretion for national courts; the exhaustive list of elements about which deception can take place allows for a certain discretion. The list for instance refers to deception about the 'main characteristics of the products' but proceeds with the wording 'such as', thus allowing national courts to expand the list of main characteristics.
The general scheme of the UCPD also allows some leeway for the national courts.
Interpreting the unfair commercial practices of the black list annexed to the UCPD, the CJEU held in 4Finance LIII that 'a practice not covered by Annex I to Directive 2005/29 may nevertheless be prohibited where a specific and concrete assessment leads to the conclusion that it is unfair within the meaning of Articles 5 to 9 of that directive'. LIV In contrast, where a practice comes within the scope of the blacklisted provisions, the prohibition is absolute. In the case law of the CJEU a literal interpretation of the blacklisted unfair practices prevails.
For instance, in Purely Creative LV the Court held that the commercial practice of informing a consumer that he has won a prize and obliging him, in order to receive that prize, to incur a cost of whatever kind, is in all circumstances prohibited. Moreover, it is not permissible to allow traders to make use of a multi-option scheme, unless at least one of the methods did not involve any payment by the consumer.
Such restrictive interpretation is legitimized by the CJEU on the basis of the high level of consumer protection pursued by the UCPD, and the precise function of the black list within the internal market. As to the first, the CJEU points out that unfair practice exploits the psychological effect caused by the announcement of the winning of a prize, in order to induce the consumer to make a choice which is not always rational, such as calling a premium rate telephone number to ask for information about the nature of the prize, travelling at great expense to collect an item of low-value crockery or paying the delivery costs of a book which he already has. Even when one of the methods would not involve any cost, the psychological exploitation of the consumer would remain the same. As concerns the internal market, the objective of legal certainty would not be achieved if traders were allowed to impose on the consumer costs which are 'de minimis' compared with the value of the prize. That would make it necessary to determine evaluation methods both for the costs and the prizes, and would also require such difficult evaluations to be carried out by national courts on a case-by-case basis, in order to prove that 'de minimis' element,
which is precisely what Annex I to the directive sought to avoid by including that practice.
LVI
Moreover, the benchmark of the 'average consumer' referred to in the UCPD creates a certain flexibility, albeit that the CJEU has to a considerable extent handcuffed national judges, by stating that, in the case that the consumer was able to make informed choices, market deregulation prevailed over national regulatory protection (see more extensively:
Straetmans 2016, [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] [208] [209] [210] . This case law concerning misleading practices will be briefly highlighted in subsection B.
Case law of the CJEU concerning misleading practices
The CJEU has consistently held that the assessment of whether an appellation, brand name or advertising statement may be misleading must take into account the presumed 
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It has since been confirmed in case law, and also more recently in legislation.
LXIII With regard to labelling requirements, the CJEU emphasized that the rational consumer, whose purchasing decisions also depend on the composition of the products, will first read the list of ingredients. As a result the average consumer who is 'reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect' is not misled by the use of a term on the label if the seemingly misleading impression the term entails is contradicted by the list of ingredients that duly indicates the presence of all the ingredients in the product. 
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Hence the German prohibition did not appear to be necessary to satisfy the requirement of consumer protection and human health. The Court therefore added 'the clinical or medical connotations of the word 'Clinique' are not sufficient to make that word so misleading as to justify the prohibition of its use on products marketed in the aforesaid circumstances' (own emphasis).
LXXII
The importance of this last sentence cannot be overlooked. Even though the CJEU recognised that the possibility should not be excluded that German consumers may wrongfully infer from the product name that it has medicinal qualities, this is not sufficient to prohibit the use of that name as deceptive. The product is presented as a cosmetic product, its presentation complies with the specific labelling requirements laid down in European directives, and the product can only be bought outside pharmacies. This information should suffice to alert the European consumer and allows him to correct his initial wrongful inferences from the product name.
The bluntness of the CJEU in Clinique, and the CJEU's preference for the European average consumer as a standard for the assessment of misleading practices, has been criticised in consumer literature as majoritarianism (Weatherill 1999, 51-85) . Some have argued that the concept of the average, confident consumer has a very weak and unreliable basis in Community law (Roth 2003, 944; Wilhemsson 2007, 243-268; Unberath 2007 Unberath , 1251 Unberath -1252 .
In the same vein, a common objection is that although information disclosure can contribute to the empowerment of consumers, it is often of very little help to vulnerable consumers when it comes to leading a self-determined life (Howells 2005, 360-372) . This has even prompted some scholars to conclude that European consumer information policy leaves out the protection of the really weak, illiterate or poor consumer (Hondius 2006, 93; Heiderhoff 2000-7, 743 ).
In consequence, the CJEU somewhat mitigated the effect of its rulings in subsequent judgments. Thus, in Estée Lauder, LXXIII whilst confirming the standard of the average consumer, the CJEU also held that 'in particular, it must be determined whether social, cultural or linguistic factors may justify the term "lifting", used in connection with a firming cream, as meaning something different to the German consumer as opposed to consumers in other Member States, or whether the instructions for the use of the product are in themselves sufficient to make it quite clear that its effects are short-lived, thus neutralising any conclusion to the contrary that might be derived from the word "lifting"'. 
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However, the mitigating effect of the reference to particular social, cultural or linguistic factors was put immediately into perspective by the Court's consideration that 'at first sight, the average consumer -reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect -ought not to expect a cream whose name incorporates the term 'lifting' to produce enduring effects'.
LXXV The CJEU acted similarly in the Linhart and Biffl LXXVI case, where it held that the mere statement 'dermatologically tested' or 'clinically tested' appearing on the packaging of soaps and hair products meant that the product was 'well tolerated or at least harmless when applied to the skin'.
LXXVII
It follows from the foregoing that the European average consumer is depicted as someone who is well capable of processing information which is disclosed in the market.
Moreover, the European average consumer has a duty to take advantage of this information, the release of which is not non-committal, especially when that information empowers him to correct his misleading impressions based on the product name, or other particulars of the product, or in advertising.
And yet, despite the preference for an average consumer tailored to the objectives of the internal market, recent developments in the CJEU's case law may reveal a changing approach towards the consumer's duty to internalize disclosed information, and perhaps also towards national courts' leeway to include national preferences in the assessment. Having regard to the settled case-law set out above, one would have expected the CJEU to rule that the list of ingredients expresses, in a manner free from doubt, the fact that the flavourings used are not obtained from vanilla and raspberries but only taste like them, and that correct and complete information provided by the list of ingredients on packaging constitutes sufficient grounds on which to rule out the existence of any misleading of consumers. As indicated above, consumers have a duty to internalize information which is disclosed to them in the market and on the products.
In the recent
At first, the Court in Teekanne confirmed that 'it is apparent from the case-law that the Court has acknowledged that consumers whose purchasing decisions depend on the composition of the products in question will first read the list of ingredients, the display of which is required'.
LXXIX
But then the CJEU surprisingly continued that 'the list of ingredients, even though correct and comprehensive, may in some situations not be capable of correcting sufficiently the (average reasonably well informed, and reasonably observant and circumspect) consumer's erroneous or misleading impression concerning the characteristics of a foodstuff that stems from the other items comprising its labelling' (own emphasis).
LXXX
In doing so, in the Teekanne case the CJEU recognised for the first time that correct and complete information provided by the list of ingredients on packaging, in accordance with the labelling of foodstuffs directive, may constitute misleading advertising. It follows that the display of the correct and comprehensive list of ingredients no longer rules out the possibility that the labelling has the capacity to mislead consumers. That would be the case for instance if some of the elements of which the labelling is composed are in practice misleading, erroneous, ambiguous, contradictory or incomprehensible.
LXXXI Indeed, the prime consideration of European labelling laws is that the consumer has correct, neutral and objective information that does not mislead him. LXXXII The CJEU added that 'where the labelling of a foodstuff and methods used for the labelling, taken as a whole, give the impression that a particular ingredient is present in that foodstuff, even though that ingredient is not in fact present, such labelling is such as could mislead the purchaser as to the characteristics of the foodstuff'(own emphasis). 
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Whether the consumer is actually being misled is for the referring court to examine. It must carry out an overall examination of the various items comprising the fruit tea's labelling in order to determine whether an average consumer may be misled as to the presence of raspberry and vanilla flower, or flavourings obtained from those ingredients.
To further guide national judges, the CJEU in Teekanne pointed out that 'in order to assess the capacity of labelling to mislead, the national court must in essence take account of the presumed expectations, in light of that labelling, which an average consumer who is reasonably well informed, and reasonably observant and circumspect has, as to the origin, provenance, and quality associated with the foodstuff, the critical point being that the consumer must not be misled and must not be induced to believe, incorrectly, that the product has an origin, provenance or quality which are other than genuine'. LXXXIV Furthermore, the national court must in particular take into account 'the words and depictions used as well as the location, size, colour, font, language, syntax and punctuation of the various elements on the fruit tea's packaging'. E -204 derives solely from the fact that it is untruthful in as much as it contains false information or that, generally, it is likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to, inter alia, the nature or main characteristics of a product or a service and that, therefore, it is likely to cause that consumer to take a 'transactional' decision that he would not have taken if there had been no such practice'.
Also, the recent Canal Digital Danmark
LXXXVIII case seems to confirm the approach taken in Teekanne. The case concerned Canal Digital's price advertising campaign for TV subscriptions on television and on the internet. The CJEU held that when the price of a product is divided into several components, one of which is particularly emphasised in the marketing, while the other is completely omitted or is presented less conspicuously, 'an assessment should be made, in particular, whether that presentation is likely to lead to a mistaken perception of the overall offer'. LXXXIX This will be the case 'if the average consumer is likely to have the mistaken impression that he is offered a particularly advantageous price, due to the fact that he could believe, wrongly, that he only had to pay the emphasised component of the price'. XC An advertisement will be all the more misleading if the omitted, or less visible, component of the price represents a significant part of the total price that the consumer is required to pay. The fact that the total price was mentioned in the initial advertising or could be retrieved on the website of the advertiser does not shield the trader from the application of the prohibition of misleading actions. The objective of a high level of consumer protection set forth in the UCPD serves as a correcting factor for literal interpretations of the Directive's provisions with adverse effects on consumer protection.
Thus, in a striking parallel with Teekanne, the CJEU emphasised in Canal Digital
Danmark that an average consumer who is provided with correct and comprehensive information in advertisements, nevertheless may have a mistaken perception of the offer due to the presentation of that information taken as a whole. The Court does so without renouncing that the average consumer must serve as a benchmark for the assessment of misleading practices (in labelling, in advertising, etc.). That way, the Court seems to confirm the stance it has developed with regard to misleading packaging of products.
Despite the absence of any reference to Teekanne, it may in our view be deduced from the approach taken in Canal Digital Danmark that a similar correction XCI to the general rule applies in both subdomains of misleading practices. The CJEU has managed to bridge the case law in both domains of unfair marketing law.
It follows that even in the case where a trader satisfies the information requirements imposed by the law, this does not rule out that the information may be presented in such a manner that the average consumer remains misled, notwithstanding the correct and comprehensive information he received. This characterization, by the national judge, must be based on an overall assessment of the case. As the CJEU pointed out in Teekanne, in some circumstances correct and comprehensive information may no longer be capable of correcting the consumer's erroneous or misleading impressions based on other informational elements.
National case law
Notwithstanding the strong adherence to the European standard of an average consumer of national courts, national traditional standards continue to play an important role in the assessment of law provisions.
Within Europe, the UK takes, for instance, a particular place. The average consumer has become the benchmark for the law of unfair commercial practices, but even before the UCPD was adopted the UK traditionally adopted a robust approach; demanding that consumers make a realistic interpretation of advertising. We have also seen that the UK is comfortable with the average consumer context, and in the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015 uses the average consumer for one additional particular point concerning unfair terms control: to determine whether a term specifying the main subject matter of the contract, or assessment of the price (see also supra), is sufficiently prominent to be excluded from the Act's assessment of fairness.
XCII
The most prominent example of the leeway granted to the Member States is Finland where psychologically inspired assessments by the Market Court remodel the average consumer, stating for instance that the value of the giveaway should not be used to distract a consumer from the price of the main product, and that reporting prices to consumers in an inconsistent way may be considered to be inappropriate, or otherwise unfair conduct, in marketing consumer goods. E -207 plaintiff has a "goodwill" or reputation in his business, that consumers are likely to be misled into buying the goods / services of the defendant, and that the plaintiff is therefore likely to suffer damage' (Kelly, 2018) . Although there was some evidence that if the consumer actually looked at the packaging and 'get up' of the defendant's soda bread they would not confuse it with that of the plaintiff, the Court held that one bakery had passed off its soda bread as that of the rival bakery, as there was the potential for confusion if consumers put in into their shopping trolley without properly looking at it. The Court emphasised 'the phenomenon of fast moving consumer goods displayed on the supermarket shelf', C and stated that 'even ordinary reasonable prudent consumers do not, in fact, frequently carry out a detailed examination of the product at the time when they take the bread from the supermarket shelf and place it in the supermarket trolley' (Kelly 2018) .
Polish courts experienced similar difficulties in advertising cases for which courts developed a formalized, two-step test. First, the targeted audience was determined on the basis of the type of the advertised product or service and, second, the medium used for the advertisement is taken into account. CI Assessments by courts were made in that particular order and may sometimes, in contrast with the Irish evolution, lead to weaker protection.
In a 2014 judgment concerning the sales of tickets to UEFA EURO 2012 football games, the Polish Supreme Court held that a term included in the standard conditions of business, according to which, in case of a discrepancy between English and Polish language versions of the conditions, the English version should prevail, was not unlawful within the meaning of Article 385 1 of the Civil Code. This was due to the fact that contested standard terms only applied to the online sales channel and therefore were addressed at a group of consumers who were more technology-savvy, active, well-informed, cautious, attentive and used to standard terms being drafted in English". 
Conclusion
We have pointed out above that legal scholars have criticised the CJEU's inclination to favour the internal market approach, to the detriment of national regulatory autonomy. It was felt that, especially in the eighties and nineties, CJEU case law disregarded national concludes that despite the legitimacy of the case law of the CJEU having been weakened by insufficiently reasoned judgments, it may be the least bad option (Snell 2015, 124-126) .
CIV
This analysis demonstrates that with regard to both the UCTD and the UCPD the CJEU took on a gap-filling role. In particular, in its case law relating to the transparency requirement in the UCTD, the CJEU gradually laid out the understandings of extensiveness in the requirement of intelligibility. This involved developing a more sophisticated model of the average consumer. Under pressure of national and behavioural economists' critiques on how the benchmark of the average consumer is applied in cases of deception, the CJEU showed itself prepared to reduce the consumer's responsibility to process information and to mitigate the consumer's duty to internalize mandated or voluntary disclosures when taking purchase decisions.
Within the paradigms debate, it comes as no surprise that now that the internal market has come of age, attention has shifted to the complementary paradigm of consumer protection. When the internal market economy is thriving, adjustments can be made to bring the internal market paradigm more in line with the high level of consumer protection that both the UCTD and UCPD intend to ensure. In this context of a more mature legal order, the CJEU is enabled, depending on the circumstances, in its display of greater deference to the preferences of the EU legislator, or to those of the Member States. It E -210 court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of those provisions, bearing in mind that it is for that court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circumstances of the case'.
CVII
The particular constitutional legal order in which the CJEU operates only allows for a process whereby the contours of a more coherent European consumer protection policy are gradually revealed. In the absence of sufficient legislative guidance at the European and national level, national courts may be increasingly inspired by the case law of the CJEU in an effort to establish the clearly desirable common expectations. Those who believe that uniformity can be achieved in practice overnight by simply adopting a common maximum norm appear over-optimistic. LXXIV Ibid., para 29. According to the German Government the use of the term 'lifting' for a firming cream may mislead consumers as to the duration of the product's effects, because it gives purchasers the impression that use of the product will obtain results which, above all in terms of their lasting effects, are identical or comparable to surgical lifting. LXXV LXXXVI Also in the domain of unfair contract terms the CJEU showed itself prepared to reduce the impact on the (un)fair character of contract clauses of even extensive pre-contractual information, see CJEU 3 April 2014, Case C-342/13, Katalin Sebestyén v Zsolt Csaba Kővári, OTP Bank Nyrt., OTP Faktoring Követeléskezelő Zrt, Raiffeisen Bank Zrt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1857. The CJEU first confirmed the fundamental importance of precontractual information for the consumer's decision to be bound by the conditions drafted in advance by the seller or supplier. But instead of connecting immediate consequences for consumers to this voluntary disclosure by the trader, the ECJ was prepared to mitigate its impact on consumers, pointing out that "even assuming that the general information the consumer receives before concluding a contract satisfies the requirement under Article 5 that it be plain and intelligible, that fact alone cannot rule out the unfairness of a clause such as that at issue (red.: arbitration clause) in the main proceedings"(own emphasis). The high level of consumer protection set forth by the Unfair Contract Terms Directive must also have played a role in the ECJ's decision. LXXXVII Limited and Aldi GMBH & Co KG v Dunnes Stores, [2017] IECA 116, at paras 104 and105. XCVI [2017] IECA 116, para 30. XCVII At this point Kelly in her contribution rightly points out that the UCPD prohibits misleading commercial practices irrespective of the trader's intentions to or not to mislead. Misleading practices is a strict liability offence. XCVIII 'It seems to me that no sensible person could be misled by the use of general slogans that are the commonplace stuff of most advertising.
[…] I think that shoppers have to be given some credit for intelligence and appreciation of common marketing practices. A lawyer's exegesis of the words used is wholly
